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Abstract 
Coming out of French colonial rule and central planning, the three transitional economies of 
Indochina, Vietnam, Cambodia and Lao PDR, embarked on market-oriented reforms in the late 
1980s and early 1990s. Vietnam was certainly the most successful, but all three countries quickly 
achieved macroeconomic stability and rapid growth. However, the Asian financial crisis in 
1997/98, as well as the countries’ use of administrative edicts in response to the crisis, highlights 
the fragile nature of their transition.   
 
The paper holds as a premise that effective integration of the three Indochina economies with the 
“old ASEANS” involves the former developing market institutions that can sustain “quality” growth 
which will take them out of the transitional economy status. It finds that, although the three 
economies are open to international trade and investment flows, their domestic market structures 
are still very much under-developed, with heavy protection of the state sector in terms of tariff 
structures and bank credits, and inadequate legal and judiciary developments. As a result, foreign 
investment flows which went principally into the state-owned enterprises in Vietnam and Lao 
PDR, and into the quota-dependent garment sector in Cambodia, peaked in the mid-1990s and 
have been declining ever since. Private sector developments have been retarded, and the 
process of building a commercial/legal infrastructure to support private enterprise has only just 
begun. 
 
Meanwhile, modern production technologies and processes involving component manufacturing 
in different countries and then assembly in yet a third country (the so-called “component 
production and assembly within integrated production systems”) means that the cost of doing 
business includes not just labour cost but also cost of services such as transport, 
telecommunication, electricity, insurance and banking. The latter are high cost industries 
dominated chiefly by SOEs in Vietnam and Lao PDR. The bilateral agreements already in place 
and the WTO agreements (when negotiated) will set deadlines for the three countries to open 
their service sectors to entry by international firms. Competition has, and will continue, to drive 
down prices for these services, thereby benefiting the domestic private sector as well as 
improving competitiveness for foreign direct investments. Implementation of the international trade 
agreements will also help to streamline cumbersome laws and regulations as well as improve the 
judiciary in the three countries, again with significant benefits for the domestic private sector. 
 
An important challenge is to develop the necessary human resources to complement the 
countries’ public administration reform. Another challenge is to maintain macroeconomic stability 
whilst opening the countries’ domestic and external financial sectors. A third challenge for the 
“New ASEANs” is to counter protectionism of the developed countries with whom they enter trade 
agreements. 
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 I. Introduction 
 
Post World War II economic and political developments in the three transitional economies 
of Indochina bear some striking similarities and significant differences (see Appendix A 
for a brief sketch of developments in these three economies). All three countries emerged 
from French colonial rule in the first half of the 1950s. By 1975, Vietnam and Lao PDR 
adopted Soviet-style central planning, but in effect, only about 50% of the farms in Lao 
PDR were collectivized due to the mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure resulting in 
difficulties of communication and central control in that country (Warr 2000). On the other 
hand, Cambodia, under the Khmer Rouge, underwent a severe form of central planning, 
resulting in the destruction of all business and market activities, as well as isolation from 
the world economy, with its people living on subsistence agriculture. Vietnamese 
occupation of Cambodia in 1979 saw the continuation of central planning, and heavy 
reliance on Soviet aid for all three countries. However, with the imminent collapse of the 
former USSR towards the latter part of the 1980s and the withdrawal of Vietnamese troops 
from Cambodia in 1989, all three countries embarked on market-oriented reforms, with the 
implementation of Doi Moi in Vietnam in 1989, the NEM (New Economic Mechanism) in 
Lao PDR in 1990, and serious reforms and resumption of relations with international 
financial institutions in Cambodia in 1993. 
 
Table I.1: Basic Economic and Social Indicators for the New ASEANs  
(The indicators are as of 2001 unless indicated otherwise) 
Country Total Area 
('000 sq 
km) 
Population 
(million)
Population 
growth rate 
av 1997-
2001 (%)
Per capita 
GDP
Life 
expectancy 
at birth
Infant 
mortality 
Adult 
illiteracy 
rate (%)
  (years) (per 1000 
lives births) 
Vietnam 332 79.5 1.30 411 69.37 30 7.32
Lao PDR  237 5.4 2.34 326 54.12 87 34.4
Cambodia 181 12.3 2.11 278 53.91 97 31.29
ASEAN(5) 3,048 376 1.69* 1342** 71.18* 19.40* 8.29*
Source:  The World Bank 2003b. World Development Indicators 2003, CDROM. 
Notes:  * Simple average 
** Weighted average (with the weight as the country's population). 
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Table I.1 shows the relevant social and economic indicators of the three Indochina 
countries compared with ASEAN(5) as at 2001. Vietnam is clearly the best performer of 
the three economies. This is due in part to the more extensive reforms in Vietnam in the 
1990s, and in part to Vietnam’s relatively better endowed human resources at the start of 
the reform period. Reforms of land and agricultural markets in Vietnam resulted in rapid 
growth in rice productivity from 1988 to 1995 (Kompas 2002), but similar reforms did not 
occur in Lao PDR and Cambodia. As a result, rural incomes remained static in those two 
countries. At the same time, skilled human resources were substantially destroyed (or fled) 
in Lao PDR and Cambodia (ADB 2001). 
 
Nevertheless, the initial successes of market reforms are evident in all three countries. 
While starting from a low GDP base, Vietnam’s average annual GDP growth, prior to the 
Asian financial crisis, exceeded that of the ASEAN(5) while those of Cambodia and Lao 
PDR were approaching the ASEAN’s (see Chart I.1).  
 
Chart I.1: GDP Growth before, during and after Asian Crisis (%).
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 Source: IMF, 2003. The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2003, [Online], Available at 
<URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/data/index.htm>, Accessed date: August 19 2003. 
   
Inflation rates before the crisis, while generally higher than ASEAN’s, were being brought 
down rapidly (see Chart I.2). 
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Chart I.2: Inflation before Asian Crisis (%).
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 Source: IMF, 2003. The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2003, [Online], Available at 
<URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/data/index.htm>, Accessed date: August 19 2003. 
 
The policy responses of the three economies to the Asian financial crisis, as well as their 
experiences immediately post-crisis, reflect the incomplete nature of their transition. In 
Vietnam, an over-valued exchange rate as well as domestic policies resulting in foreign 
direct investment (FDI) flowing into the unprofitable state owned enterprise sector were 
already leading to declines in export growth and FDI inflows in the six months prior to the 
eruption of the Asian crisis (Riedel 1999). In order to protect the already precarious 
balance of payments situation, draconian controls were imposed on imports and capital 
flows at the onset of the crisis (Leung and Le Dang Doanh 1998)1. These administrative 
controls continued through 1999/2000 and impacted negatively on Vietnam’s exports and 
GDP growth as the region emerged from the crisis. Chart I.1 shows that Vietnam’s GDP 
growth post-crisis was below the pre-crisis average.  
 
In Lao PDR, the five-fold depreciation of the kip, in response to the baht depreciation, 
contributed to inflationary pressures. In addition to this, however, there was a large budget 
deficit in 1998 well in excess of foreign funding resources, and had to be monetized, 
adding further to inflationary pressures. The large budget deficit resulted from an 
administrative edict to maintain food security in Lao PDR by an extensive program of 
investment in irrigation (about 5% of GDP in 1998 alone). At the same time, the central 
administration failed to value export taxes using the depreciated value of the kip, hence 
                                                 
1 The number of items under import quotas doubled in 1999. 
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resulting in a substantial fall in tax revenue2. The administrative edict, the failure to use 
market values, and the monetization of the resultant budget deficit are all features of a 
transitional economy which, when under stress, reverted to pre-reform modes of behaviour 
(Warr 2000). Chart I.3 shows that inflation in Lao PDR averaged over 50% pa in 1997 and 
1998, and reached 128% in 1999. 
 
Chart I.3: Inflation before, during and after crisis (%)
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 Source: IMF, 2003. The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database April 2003, [Online], Available at 
<URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/01/data/index.htm>, Accessed date: August 19 2003. 
 
Cambodia experienced political as well as economic instability in 1997 as fighting broke 
out between the two coalition parties. The vulnerability of a narrow development base was 
made clear when tourism and construction were brought to a standstill by the political 
crisis, with garment exports to the EU and US providing the only buffer to an otherwise 
bleak outlook in industrial and employment growth. The Enhanced Structural Adjustment 
Facilities program with the IMF collapsed, and economic reforms were disrupted. Between 
1996 and 1998, household incomes declined and unemployment rates doubled (Sok Hach 
2000). 
 
Since 2000, Lao PDR has regained macroeconomic stability, while Vietnam has begun to 
deepen its reforms and further develop its institutions. The political environment in 
                                                 
2 Export taxes were valued at administered prices rather than at international prices denominated in $US. If 
the latter prices were used, the devalued kip would have meant significant increases in export prices and 
hence in the tax base. 
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Cambodia, despite a stalemate after the July election in 2003, has finally been resolved one 
year later.3
 
However, the countries’ responses to the Asian financial crisis, as well as their experience 
post crisis, highlight the fragile nature of their transition process. Even in Vietnam, the 
most successful and advanced economy in the Indochina region, many of the institutional 
reforms have been more apparent than real. For example, the inadequate courts and 
judiciary system has meant that, although the Bankruptcy Law was enacted in 1993, up 
until 2000, only 22 cases of bankruptcy had actually been brought to the courts in Ho Chi 
Minh city, the commercial hub of the country. Of these 22 cases, only three were 
eventually declared bankrupt, the other cases having been either dismissed or still pending. 
By comparison, in the first nine months of 2001, more than 300 companies disappeared 
without formal liquidation (Youth 2/11/2001).  
 
In both Vietnam and Lao PDR, although the “two-tiered” banking system has the 
appearance of a modern financial sector, the dominant state ownership and the lack of 
skills on the part of the state-owned “commercial” banks have meant that credit has been 
going to the SOEs, and the domestic private sector (including the rural sector) has been 
stymied by lack of finance. In Cambodia where the SOE sector is relatively small, 
insufficient legal protection of lenders, together with poor dispute resolution mechanisms, 
has meant that an estimated 54% of savings in Cambodian banks are lent to investors 
outside the country, in spite of relatively high domestic interest rates (CDRI 2002).  
 
Indeed, as pointed out by Perkins (2000), the transitional economies of Asia such as China 
achieved initial gains through utilizing (and re-activating) pre-existing institutions, such as 
those related to foreign trade and foreign investment through their nationals living abroad. 
But continuing transition requires building new market institutions and deepening of 
reforms.  
 
This paper holds as a premise that effective integration of the three Indochina economies 
with the “old ASEANs” involves the former developing market institutions that can sustain 
                                                 
3 Although the Cambodian Peoples’ Party won a landslide victory in the July election last year, the other two 
political parties refused to recognize the election results. Protracted negotiations finally resulted in the 
formation of a collation government in July 2004. 
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“quality” growth which will take them out of the transitional economy status. The paper 
therefore documents the progress towards external integration on the part of the three 
economies, analyzes the consequences posed by the lag in internal liberalization, and 
explores ways in which continuing integration into the world economy can help the 
transitional economies of Indochina deepen their reforms and institutions. International 
trade agreements (such as the Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement, regional agreements 
such as AFTA, arrangements such as APEC, and of course, the WTO) bind domestic 
governments to undertake deeper legal, industrial and financial sector reforms. 
International integration in the form of foreign direct investment can, if properly managed, 
boost the domestic private sector while allowing time for the reform of SOEs. International 
capital flows in the form of development assistance can help build both physical and 
social/economic infrastructure, as well as help ease the pain of transition. 
 
Section two therefore documents the countries’ progress so far towards trade, investment 
and financial integration, emphasizing the openness of these economies to trade and 
investment flows, particularly within the Asian region, whilst trying administratively to 
close their borders to short-term capital flows. Section three points out that, despite rapid 
external integration, internal liberalization is lagging behind, resulting in protectionist trade 
regimes, underdeveloped domestic private sectors, and declining FDI flows into the region. 
Whether continued international and regional integration can further the transition and 
internal liberalization process of the economies, as well as the risks involved, is addressed 
in Section four. 
 
II. How far has integration progressed? 
 
Trade and Investment Links 
 
At an aggregate level, international trade and investment links from Vietnam, Lao PDR 
and Cambodia have grown very rapidly, making them some of the most “open” economies 
in the world. 
 
Trade growth and openness 
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In Vietnam, the impact of the initial liberalization and reforms of Doi Moi resulted in  
average export growth of 22% pa  prior to the Asian crisis, and around 16% pa since then 
(see Table V.1 below for export growth rates and Appendix Table B.1 for more detailed 
balance of payments statistics). Rapid growth in rice production (at 6.1% pa between 1988 
and 1994) was responsible for the healthy export performance in the first half of the 1990s, 
when Vietnam turned from a net rice importer to the world’s second largest rice exporter. 
As mentioned in section 1 above, the downturn in export growth in 1998 is probably 
attributable to an over-valued exchange rate4 and to the government’s policy response of 
restricting imports (which dropped sharply in 1997, 1998 and 1999) as much as to the 
crisis in the region. The slowdown in 2001 and the downturn in 2002 are attributed mainly 
to falling prices of Vietnam’s commodity exports (rice, coffee and petroleum) as well as 
the general slowdown in the world economy. Export growth picked up in 2003. 
Furthermore, as Table V.1 shows, the ratios of exports and imports to GDP approach 
almost 50%, indicating that Vietnam’s economy is indeed “open” to international trade by 
regional and world standards. 
 
Table V.1: Vietnam - Export and Import Growth Rates, and Shares in GDP 
(percentages) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Export growth rate 34.4 33.2 26.6 1.9 23.3 24.0 4.5 11 20.8
Import growth rate 40.0 36.6 4.0 -0.8 1.1 30.8 2.3 22.2 27.8
Exports/GDP 26.3 29.4 34.3 34.5 40.2 45.6 46.2 47.6 51.7
Imports/GDP 39.3 45.2 43.3 42.4 40.5 48.5 49.5 56.2 58.7
Trade 
balance/GDP -13.1 -15.8 -9.0 -7.9 -0.3 -2.8 2.9 -8.6 -7.0
Source:  - 1995 –2001: GSO and CIEM data base.  
- 2002: The World Bank 2003a, Vietnam at a glance, [Online], Available at <URL: 
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/vnm_aag.pdf>, Accessed date: 7/10/2003.  
- 2003: Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2004. Key Indicators 2004, [Online], Available at <URL: 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2004/default.asp>, Accessed date: 23/09/2004. 
 
Not surprisingly, the trade regime in Lao PDR is much more restrictive than that of 
Vietnam’s. Import and export licensing systems are still in place, and SOEs continue to 
dominate the export of timber and furniture. The restrictive regime, together with a narrow 
                                                 
4 It has been shown that the administered interest rate paid on dong deposits in Vietnamese banks were not 
sufficient to compensate for the expected depreciation of the dong after the Asian financial crisis. Hence, an 
uncovered interest differential opened up in favour of US dollar deposits in Vietnam (Leung and Kompas 
2003). 
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export base, accounts for the single-digit export growth rates for most of the years since 
1995 (see Table L.1 below for export growth rates, and Appendix Table B.2 for more 
detailed balance of payments data).  
 
Table L.1: Lao PDR - Export and Import Growth Rate (percentages) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Merchandise export 
growth 
4 3 -1 6 3 3 2 3.7 n.a
Export growth (including 
service) 
1 2 1 18 8 8 4 -6.9 23
    
Growth of import 4 17 -6 -15 0 3 0 -8.4 7.2
    
Trade balance /GDP -13 -16 -13 -8 -7 -5 -6 -9.3 -6.4
Source:  - Data from 1995-2001: IMF country report from various issues. 
- Data for 2002 - 2003: Asian Development Bank (ADB), 2004. Key Indicators 2004, [Online], Available at 
<URL: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2004/default.asp>, Accessed date: 
23/09/2004.  
 
Official statistics indicate that merchandise export as a proportion of GDP is about 24%. 
Together with tourism, recorded export as a proportion of GDP is about 29%.  However, 
estimates by the Bank of Thailand indicate that unofficial cross border trade with Thailand 
is about 50% of officially recorded trade (Bank of Thailand 2003). This would put the 
export/GDP ratio well into the 30-40% range, indicating that the economy is quite 
integrated with world trade. 
 
Unlike Vietnam and Lao PDR, Cambodia had relatively early access to the US market (in 
1996) which, together with access to the EU on the GSP basis, provided ready markets for 
Cambodia’s garments exports. Trade grew at a rapid pace prior to the Asian financial 
crisis, and export and import as proportion of GDP is well over 50%, higher even than 
Vietnam (see Table C.1 below for export growth rates, and Appendix Table B.3 for more 
detailed balance of payments data). Cambodia’s garment industry faces serious challenges 
 9
as quotas will be abolished in January 2005 as a result of the WTO Agreement on Clothing 
and Textiles.5
 
Table C.1: Cambodia's Export and Import (1993-2003) 
 (Percentages). 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
            
Goods Exp Growth rate  90.9 37.8 -20.1 61.9 8.8 26.7 38.7 11.4 15.9 19.3
Goods Imp Growth rate  33.6 47.8 -1.6 16.1 9.3 28.3 31.3 8.1 12.2 24.9
    
Goods Exp/GDP, fob 12.4 22.6 26.2 19.2 28.3 26.3 29.5 38.9 41.1 44.2 49.3
Goods Imp/GDP, cif 26.9 34.2 42.6 38.5 40.7 38.0 43.1 53.8 55.2 57.5 67.2
            
Trade Balance/GDP -14.5 -11.7 -16.4 -19.3 -12.4 -11.7 -13.6 -14.9 -14.1 -13.3 -17.9
Source:  - Data from 1993 to 2002 is from the National Institute of Statistics (2003) "Statistical Year Book 
2003", Ministry of Planning, Phnom Penh, Cambodia. 
- 2003 data is calculated from IMF (2004) "Cambodia: Statistical Appendix", IMF Country Report No. 
04/330. 
 
Narrow export base leading to large fluctuations in revenue 
 
In spite of rapid growth, however, the export base (with the exception of Vietnam) is quite 
narrow. Even in Vietnam commodity exports, although falling in recent years, still 
represent over 60% of Vietnam’s exports, with manufacturing rising to about 37% (see 
Appendix C.1). There is, however, a reasonably wide range of export products in both 
commodities and manufactures. Vietnam’s imports are mainly machinery and fuel, 
reflecting the dominance of imported inputs. 
 
Unlike Vietnam and Cambodia, Laotian manufactures did not have access to the US 
market. It did, however, begin receiving GSP from the EU starting 19976. This has been 
chiefly responsible for the growth in garment exports comprising about 31% of 
merchandise export. Electricity to Thailand is about 27% of merchandise export and timber 
                                                 
5 As at 2002, garments constitute about 75% of Cambodia’s total exports, 30% of Lao exports, and only 
about 16% of Vietnam’s total exports. Furthermore, whilst almost all of Cambodian and Laotian garment 
exports are to quota countries of US and EU, only 1/3 of Vietnam’s garment exports are under quotas to the 
EU. Therefore, the removal of quotas is expected to impact most negatively on Cambodia, neutral on Lao 
PDR, and even some positive impact on Vietnam (IMF Cambodia Country Report 2004). 
6 In addition to GSP, the EC-Lao PDR Trade in Textiles Agreement became effective in Dec 1998. This 
enabled unlimited (quota free) access of Lao PDR exports to the EC for the period 1999-2001. This has now 
been extended to all goods other than arms trade. 
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and furniture (23%) being exported chiefly to Japan and the US. These three items, in 
addition to tourism, constitute the rather narrow export base (see Appendix C.2) 
 
Despite rapid export growth prior to the Asian crisis, Cambodia’s export base is extremely 
narrow, comprising essentially of garments and tourism -- GSP exports and service export 
represent over 85% of total exports (see Appendix C.3). Excessive logging has led to 
serious de-forestation, resulting in a ban on log exports. At the same time, inadequate land 
reform and distribution of property rights in land have severely retarded agricultural 
development, including rice and forestry. Cambodia has the second lowest productivity in 
rice growing in Asia, and no rice exports. 
 
The openness of the three economies, together with narrow export bases, results in 
relatively large fluctuations in export incomes (see Chart I.4 below). In Vietnam, for 
example, the large fall in coffee prices in recent years accentuated the hardship of small 
coffee growers and resulted in temporary stockpiling of coffee (de Fontenay and Leung 
2001). Even though the ineffective and wasteful stockpiling policy has been abandoned, 
more sustainable methods of managing commodity price fluctuations (such as the use of 
futures trading) is not yet possible due to the lack of human resources as well as 
developments in the financial sector. 
 
Chart I.4: Fluctuations in Export Earnings (1993 to 2000)
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Trade with East and Southeast Asia 
 
In all three countries, the share of trade with East and Southeast Asian countries has been 
high, ranging between 60% to 80% (see charts V.1, L.1, and C.1 below). However, exports 
to the US from Vietnam in 2003 rose by some 90% against a 20.8% growth in total 
exports. The US will increase in dominance as Vietnam’s trading partner as the Vietnam-
US bilateral trade agreement continues to take effect.  
 
Finally, in contrast to Vietnam and Lao PDR, official statistics indicate that Cambodia’s 
exports to the Asian region have dropped significantly over 1990s (from almost 90% in 
1995 to less than 10% of total exports in 2001. See Chart C.1). This reflects the result of a 
ban on log exports in recent years as well as increased textiles and garments quotas to the 
US and the EU. Informal cross-border trade between Cambodia and Thailand is reported to 
be thriving—particularly for the export of low value agricultural produce into Thailand and 
the smuggling of beverage and portable tanks of nitrogen gas into Cambodia (Ministry of 
Commerce, Cambodia, 2001). However, no quantitative estimates exist as to the value of 
this trade. 
 
Chart V.1: The Share of ASEAN and East Asia* in Vietnam's Export and Import
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Country Report No: 02/5, Washington D.C., USA. 
- 1997-02: International Monetary Fund, 2003. “Vietnam: Statistical Appendix”, Country Report No: 03/382, 
Washington D.C., USA. 
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 Chart L.1: The share of East and Southeast Asia in Lao’s Export and imports.
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Chart C.1: The Share of East and Southeast Asia in Cambodia's Exports and Imports 
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Openness to FDI – particularly from east and Southeast Asia 
 
As well as being a relatively open economy in terms of international trade, Vietnam is 
arguably one of the most open economies in the region in terms of foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Using 1999 statistics, for every US$1000 of GDP, the share of FDI 
pledges in Vietnam is $567. This is higher than Thailand (US$49), Malaysia (US$47), 
China (US$41), and more than double the average of the ASEAN countries (US$21) 
(UNCTAD 2000). FDI projects have also been important in the hydropower and mining 
sectors of Lao PDR, and in garments, tourism and other services in Cambodia.  
                                                 
7 Pledges are different from actual FDI inflows shown in balance of payments statistics. 
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 Asian investors rank amongst the highest foreign investors in all three countries. As at the 
end of 2003, the top five foreign investors in Vietnam (in terms of total capital invested) 
are Singapore (US$7.34 billion), Taiwan ($US6 billion), Japan (US$4.5 billion), South 
Korea (US$4.2 billion) and Hong Kong (US$3 million) (Vittorio Leproux and Douglas H. 
Brooks, 2004). Thai investors are dominant (50% of total capital pledged) in Lao PDR 
while Malaysian investors are dominant (almost 50% of total capital pledged) in 
Cambodia. The reliance on Asia for FDI inflows has been one amongst other factors for 
the slow pickup in FDI into the Indo-China region since the Asian financial crisis. The 
distortions in the trade and investment regime accounting for the poor “quality” of FDI and 
the slowdown in FDI flows are discussed in Section three below. 
 
Financial Links 
 
Apart from FDI inflows into the three Indo-China countries, aid flows in the past decade 
have also been significant, and represent some of the highest ratios of aid to GDP in the 
developing world (see Table I.2).  
 
Table I.2: Aid Flows 
 2000 2001 2002 
 Net 
ODA 
Multilateral 
share in Net 
ODA 
Net ODA Multilateral 
share in Net 
ODA
Net ODA Multilateral 
share in Net 
ODA 
Net 
ODA/GDP
 (Mil. 
USD) 
(Mil. 
USD)
(Mil. 
USD)
 
Cambodia 398 38% 420 37% 487 39% 13.30%
Lao PDR 282 31% 245 38% 278 36% 14.96%
Vietnam 1,682 25% 1450 41% 1,277 40% 3.74%
Total for developing 
countries 50,327 27% 52,153 31% 61,593 29% 1.16%
Source: - OECD, 2004. "DAC online - Annual aggregated statistics on aid and other resource flows", 
[Online], Available at: <URL:http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/50/16/5037775.htm>, Accessed date: 27/9/2004. 
- IMF, 2003. “The World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database September 2003”, [Online], Available at: 
<URL: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2003/02/data/index.htm>, Accessed date: 27/9/2004. 
- The World Bank 2003b, World Development Indicators 2003, CDROM. 
 
Of greater importance than the dollar amounts is the increasing emphasis given by some 
bilateral and multilateral donors to technical assistance and human resource development. 
Towards the latter part of the 1990s, Japan’s aid to Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia has 
been shifting from infrastructure building to technical assistance (Vo Tri Thanh 2003). One 
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of the most recent initiatives by the ADB, using Japanese funding, is a package to enhance 
capacity building and human resource development to complement the Public 
Administration Reforms being carried out in the three countries. The significance of this 
change in emphasis in terms of institutional capacity-building will be discussed in Section 
four below. 
   
In contrast to the relative openness of the three countries in trade and investment, 
particularly to the Asian region, their external financial sectors remain administratively 
closed to short term portfolio flows. However, in the case of Vietnam, there is evidence 
that short term capital flows have, throughout the 1990s, been interfering with the State 
Bank’s ability to conduct an independent monetary policy in the context of a pegged 
exchange rate regime (CIEM 2003)8. Given the regulated domestic banking sector and the 
existence of exchange controls, this result indicates that administrative controls were more 
porous than previously thought, and that short-term financial linkages existed to some 
extent. In addition, the balance of payments statistics (see Appendix Table B.1) indicate 
fairly large short- term capital outflows from Vietnam since 1997. This was accompanied 
by increases in private transfers into the country starting about 1996. The transfers were a 
response to the government’s policy to encourage US dollar deposits in Vietnamese banks 
on the part of overseas Vietnamese. Finding that the US dollar deposit rates in overseas 
banks were higher than the administered US dollar deposit rates in Vietnam, Vietnamese 
banks siphoned their “excess” US dollar deposits abroad to earn the interest differential 
which, in 2000, was as high as 2% (Leung and Kompas 2003). This indicates that 
Vietnamese financial institutions are quite ready to engage in short-term arbitrage activities 
whenever they are permitted to do so.   
 
Although data are not readily available for Lao PDR and Cambodia, the openness of these 
economies to cross-border trade and the high incidence of US dollars circulating in these 
economies9 would indicate that capital controls are porous and that short-term financial 
flows could be quite high. 
 
                                                 
8 The degree to which capital flows offset the effectiveness of monetary policy was estimated at –0.55 to        
–0.79 (CIEM 2003). 
9 The foreign currency deposit to M2 ratio in Cambodia in 2000 was well over 65% whilst that for Lao PDR 
was as high as 75% (IMF 2002). 
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III.  Is transition lagging behind integration and what are the 
consequences? 
 
Distorted trade regimes 
 
Despite rapid growth in trade, investment, and aid flows during the last decade, the 
countries’ actual pace of trade liberalization and the structure of their trade regimes are 
considerably less impressive. 
 
In Vietnam where protection of the SOEs has been a main consideration of trade policy, 
nominal tariff rates have actually risen in recent years, from a mean of 12.3% in 1996 to 
15.7% in 2001, in order to compensate for a reduction in import quotas (Parker and Riedel 
2002).  
 
Furthermore, the “cascading” nature of the tariff structure means that the effective rate of 
protection is much higher than the nominal rate.10 Chart I.4 shows the high effective rates 
of protection of Vietnam and Cambodia compared with some other ASEAN countries and 
South Korea. To the extent that effective rates of protection are an indicator of anti-export 
biases, this creates incentives for firms to sell in the domestic market rather than to export, 
thereby limiting the opportunities for export growth and diversification.11  Continued 
growth in labour-intensive manufacturing exports is needed in Vietnam for creating the 
estimated 1.4 million new jobs each year in order to accommodate the population growth 
as well as the displaced labour from the countryside. As discussed in Section two above, 
the relative lack of export diversification results in large fluctuations in revenues, and 
increases the importance of developing skilled human resources and financial instruments 
to manage the fluctuations in a sustainable manner. 
 
                                                 
10 “Cascading” nature means that tariffs on final goods are higher than tariffs on intermediate inputs. The 
much higher effective rate of protection means that producers have a greater incentive to sell in the domestic 
market than to export because of the higher prices prevailing in the domestic market. 
11 Parker and Riedel (1999) point out that the existence of pro-export measures such as duty clawbacks and 
export subsidies have made effective rates of protection less relevant as measures of anti-export biases. 
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Chart I.4: Effective Rates of Protection in Manufacturing in Selected 
Southeast Asian Countries
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 Source:  For Cambodia, see Ministry of Commerce 2001 (data for 1997). For other countries, see Prema-
Chandra Athukorala, “Trade policy reforms, export strategies and incentive structure in Vietnam”, March 
2002. 
 
In addition to protection of SOEs, import tariffs are an important source of government 
revenue in all three countries. Currently, import duties are the single largest source of 
government revenue (about 23% in Vietnam, 24% in Lao PDR, and almost 50% in 
Cambodia12). Unless revenue from VAT and corporate and personal income taxes increase 
in the future, this could pose a significant barrier to further tariff reductions. 
 
Distorted FDI flows 
 
Because of the historical protection of the state sector in Vietnam’s trade regime, 98% of 
the foreign joint ventures are with the SOEs. As a result, almost 30% of FDI projects are in 
heavy industries and oil and gas (see Chart V.2). As expected, these are also highly-
protected industries such as car and motorbike production, cement, steel and consumer-
electronic assembly. Therefore, despite the fact that FDI companies in 2001 contributed 
about 13% to Vietnam’s GDP, 35% to industrial output, 23% to export, and 25% to total 
state budget, the contribution of FDI to overall employment was only 0.3% (Le Dang 
Doanh 2002).  
 
                                                 
12 Estimates from Parker and Riedel 2002 for Vietnam, and Customs and Excise Department and National 
Institute of Statistics estimate for Cambodia. In Lao PDR, the government was to introduce the VAT in 2003, 
but has not done so yet by end 2004.  
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Chart V.2: Number of projects by sector as of 2 July 2002.
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  Source: Vietnam Investment Reviews, No 563/July 29-August 4, and 2002. 
 
The bulk (64%) of FDI inflows into Lao PDR is in hydropower industry (see chart L.2). 
 
Chart L.2: FDI projects by sectors
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Although the number of projects has remained constant, the average size of the project has 
dropped, even after achieving macroeconomic stability subsequent to the Asian crisis. The 
general “unfriendly” government policy towards domestic business development in the 
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past, together with the need for import and export licenses, has proved to be problematic 
for foreign investors (Pholsena 2002). 
 
In contrast to Vietnam and Lao PDR, the lack of a substantial SOE sector in Cambodia 
means that over 90% of FDI is in light industry, services and tourism (see Chart C.2). 
Between 1995-96, FDI flows into Cambodia concentrated on tourism and construction in 
an effort to exploit the historical sites around Ankor Wat. From 1996-98, the second wave 
of FDI concentrated on logging. The third wave of FDI occurred in the garment industry. 
 
Chart C.2: Investment projects by Sector in Cambodia from 1994-2002.
Service
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Agri/Agro. Industry
9%
Industry
75%
 Source: CIB/CDC (adjusted). 
 
As a result, the employment-generating effect of FDI has been much higher than in 
Vietnam. For 2001 in the garment sector alone, the new projects were expected to create 
12,457 jobs, accounting for 78% of all the expected jobs to be created in that year 
(Thoraxy 2002). However, the imminent termination of the garment quotas in 2005 has 
meant that FDI flows are rapidly diminishing. Therefore, the declining trend in FDI flows 
is evident in Cambodia as in Vietnam and Lao PDR since the Asian crisis. Chart I.5 shows 
that FDI flows into the Indochina region in dollar terms peaked in 1997 and have been 
falling since then. Furthermore, FDI inflows to Indochina as a percentage of inflows to all 
developing countries peaked in 1994 (well before the Asian financial crisis), and have not 
returned to their former heights. 
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Chart I.5: Falling FDI inflows to Indochina
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 Source: - UNCTAD, 2003. FDI Statistics, [Online], Available at: <URL: 
http://r0.unctad.org/en/subsites/dite/fdistats_files/fdistats.htm>, Accessed date: 13/10/2003. 
 - Data for Cambodia from 1988-1991 is not available. 
 
An important factor behind the concern over FDI flows lies in the recognition that modern 
production technologies and processes in manufacturing often involve making components 
of the final product in different countries, and then assembling the final product in yet a 
third country (the so-called “component production and assembly within vertically 
integrated production systems”). This means that investment and operation in one country 
have to be closely co-ordinated with the operations of companies in several different 
countries. An implication is that multinational companies are increasingly looking for 
mergers and acquisitions with domestic companies to engage in component production and 
final assembly rather than go into joint ventures in “green field” projects. Mergers and 
acquisitions are very limited in Vietnam as foreign investors are permitted to purchase only 
a maximum of 30% in a domestic enterprise, including an SOE, although the enterprise 
may be operating in an area where 100%-owned foreign companies are permitted to 
operate (Le Dang Doanh 2002). In this regard, Lao PDR has moved further than Vietnam 
in having sold to foreign investors substantial equity in a number of SOEs13.  
 
Another implication of the component production and assembly process is that low cost 
labour, easy access to plentiful natural resources, and large and protected domestic markets 
– traditional advantages of the Indochina transitional economies -- are no longer sufficient 
                                                 
13 For example, its telecommunications company and the Beer Lao brewery. 
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to attract foreign investors. Instead, cheap and reliable telecommunication and transport 
systems, access to local finance and skilled labour, protection of property rights (partly as 
security for accessing finance) as well as efficient court systems for resolving disputes 
have become important areas of comparative advantage for attracting foreign investment. 
These are some of the factors identified in the First Foreign Investment Forum held in Lao 
PDR in May 2002 (Pholsena 2002). Interestingly, addressing issues of property rights and 
generally building the commercial/legal infrastructure for doing business will go a long 
way towards enhancing the development of the domestic private sector as well as attracting 
foreign business investments. Similarly, reducing infrastructure costs such as electricity 
and telecommunications will also help domestic as well as foreign businesses.  
 
Underdeveloped domestic private sector 
 
The “litmus test” of inadequate internal liberalization is an underdeveloped domestic 
private sector. After one and half decade of transition, the SOEs still form about half of the 
total production of the Vietnamese industrial and services sectors (see Chart V.3)14.  
                                                 
14 Production from foreign invested enterprises is counted in the non-state sector even though these 
enterprises are in joint ventures with SOEs. Agriculture, fishing and forestry are mainly in individual (non-
state) ownership. 
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 Chart V.3: Vietnam GDP by ownership in selected sectors. 
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Chart V.3a: Vietnam - GDP in Industry and Construction Sector by Ownership
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 Source: - International Monetary Fund, 2003. “Vietnam: Statistical Appendix”, Country Report No: 03/382, 
Washington D.C., USA. 
 
An important constraint on private sector growth is the lack of credit flowing to private 
businesses from the banking system. Total bank loans to the non-state sector accounts for 
about 20% of domestic credit while the share of this sector is about 50% of GDP, 
providing 80% of the employment in the country (Riedel 2000). A fundamental issue here 
rests with the problem of providing collateral which, in Vietnam, usually takes the form of  
the Certificate of Land Use Rights (CLUR). In a survey of the private sector in 2002, it 
was found that only 16.8% of the urban population in Vietnam have been issued with 
Certificates of Land Use Rights. Furthermore, even for those issued with CLURs, their 
valuations are determined by provincial price committees rather than by the market. Hence, 
most CLURs are under-valued, and the firms surveyed claimed that some of them were 
able to borrow only about 10% of the market value of their real estate (International 
Finance Corporation 2002). Perhaps as a result of the difficulties surrounding collateralized 
lending, since 1999, banks have been permitted to move away from collaterals to 
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“credibility-based” lending. However, in practice, collateralized lending is still the norm 
(International Finance Corporation 2002). In addition, the state-owned commercial banks 
are still under direction to give preference to the SOEs and to big projects (CIEM 2003). 
The non-bank financial institutions are underdeveloped and cannot, as yet, be a significant 
channel of credit for the domestic private sector (CIEM 2003). 15
 
In Lao PDR and Cambodia, grossly underdeveloped financial sectors result in low levels of 
credit going to their domestic private sectors. In 2001, only 9.6% of GDP in Lao PDR, and 
7% of GDP in Cambodia went as domestic credit to their private sectors compared with 
127.2% in China, 20.5% in Indonesia, 149.2% in Malaysia, and 40.1% in the Philippines 
(The World Bank 2003b). As mentioned in Section one above, lack of legal protection for 
lenders and inadequate dispute resolution mechanisms in Cambodia have resulted in 54% 
of bank credit going to investors outside the country. Like in Vietnam, lack of clear 
property rights and hence assets to be used as securities for bank loans are important 
underlying reasons for poor credit supplies to the domestic private sector. 
 
 
IV. Can integration further internal liberalization and transition? 
 
For the first five years since Doi Moi (1989 to 1994), Vietnam’s entry into international 
trade and investment had been done on a unilateral basis. The government wanted to boost 
economic growth and development through opening its economy to world markets and 
foreign direct investment and aid flows. However, towards the end of the 1990s, and 
increasingly in the new millenium, Vietnam’s international integration is being carried out 
in the form of binding international agreements (Warner et al 2001). Vietnam has been a 
member of AFTA since 1995 and of APEC since 1998. A trade and investment agreement 
is being implemented with the European Union, and the most recent, and potentially most 
significant, bilateral trade agreement with the US was ratified in December 2001, and is 
being implemented. Vietnam also recently completed a market access agreement with the 
EU, and is in the process of negotiating market access with other members of the WTO, 
with the aim of joining by late 2005. 
 
                                                 
15 Private sector developments are, however, beginning to impact on the Vietnamese economy (CIEM 2004). 
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Similarly, Lao PDR and Cambodia both committed themselves to trade liberalization under 
AFTA. Cambodia joined the WTO in 2003 and Lao PDR is actively seeking to join. 
 
These binding international agreements set a time frame within which the three countries 
have to open up sectors of their economies to international competition, thus propelling the 
momentum of reforms as well as posing risks for non-compliance. 
 
How can economic integration in the form of binding international agreements, as well as 
FDI and international assistance, help to further the development of internal market-
friendly institutions and provide a better environment for business? 
 
Help domestic private sector by lowering the costs of doing business 
 
As discussed in section three above, the vertically integrated systems of component 
production and assembly involving simultaneous investments in several countries means 
that not only are labour costs an important item in manufacturing costs, but services such 
as telecommunication, transport, electricity, insurance and banking have also become 
significant costs of manufacturing. As shown in Table I.3, the charges for international 
phone calls, container transportation, and electricity in the major cities of Vietnam, Lao 
PDR and Cambodia were, as at 2003, amongst the highest in East and Southeast Asian 
cities, even though their labour costs are relatively low. However, since May 2004, 
Vietnam has significantly lowered its telephone charges so that currently, a 3-minute call 
to Japan is about $2.45 which is comparable to that of Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, and 
Jakarta. The bilateral agreements already in place and the WTO agreements (when 
negotiated for Vietnam and Lao PDR) will set deadlines for the three countries to open 
their service sectors to entry by international firms. Competition is likely to drive down the 
high prices currently being charged for those services (as is seen in the case of telephone 
charges in Vietnam), thereby benefiting the domestic private sectors as well.  
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International telephone cost (A 3 minute call to Japan)
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Container transportation (40/fl/container) (from factory to 
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Electricity cost for business/KWh
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Source: See Appendix Table D.1. 
 
There will, of course, be resistance from the SOEs which are entrenched in these sectors. 
On the other hand, all three governments are highly aware of the need to maintain FDI 
inflows in a very competitive global environment. It is also becoming increasingly clear 
that the high costs of services in these countries are deterring foreign investors. Therefore, 
even though the political ideology in Vietnam and Lao PDR may not be in favour of 
domestic private sector development per se, the commitment to maintaining foreign 
investment could mean that there would be significant pressure to comply with the 
international agreements.  
 
Focus on reducing the entire spectrum of business costs in Vietnam, Lao PDR and 
Cambodia, and not only on labour costs, will also have the added benefit of ensuring that 
these countries do not fall into the “low cost labour trap” and become marginalized at the 
lower end of the income/industrial structure of ASEAN (Vo Tri Thanh 2003). 
 
Hasten the divestment of SOEs 
 
As mentioned in Section three above, perhaps as a result of the changed production 
processes, foreign companies are moving away from joint ventures in “green field” 
investment projects as a foreign investment strategy in favour of mergers and acquisitions 
of existing domestic enterprises. Currently, Vietnam has an upper limit of 30% of an 
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existing enterprise permissible for foreign acquisition, presumably to protect its SOEs 
(Decision no. 36/2003/QD-TTg). In sectors where 100% foreign ownership is allowed, this 
regulation is obviously not effective as a protective device against foreign competition. 
The issue is therefore whether the government will, in its effort to protect the SOEs, resist 
opening (particularly the services) sectors to foreign acquisitions, thereby risking non-
compliance with the international agreements to which it has already committed or in the 
process of negotiating. 
 
There are certainly political costs involved in selling off the large SOEs to foreign 
companies. On the other hand, given that SOEs in Vietnam currently provide less than 9% 
of total employment (McCarty, 1999), the static re-structuring costs in terms of jobs lost 
may not be very high. At the same time, there is the potential for new types of jobs to be 
created. The issue then rests with the re-training of workers. China appears to be preparing 
for its WTO commitments by rapidly selling off its SOEs at the provincial level (Garnaut 
and Song 2003). A roadmap could then be formed for eventually opening its protected 
sectors to foreign investment and competition. Once this happens, the pressure on divesting 
SOEs in Vietnam would be very strong indeed. 
 
As mentioned earlier, Lao PDR has gone further than Vietnam so far in selling equities in 
its SOEs to foreign interests. 
 
Improve the countries’ legal and regulatory institutions  
 
Like China, the three Indo-China countries’ integration with the world economy has meant 
that more of their goods and services are traded in international markets and more of their 
capital formation has been funded by foreigners. However, the countries’ laws and 
regulatory practices (their “commercial/legal infrastructure”) have lagged behind external 
integration. For example, there are no pro-competition or anti-trust laws, and the judiciary 
and dispute settlement systems are poorly developed (CIEM 2003). Much of this will have 
to change as the countries pursue their accession to the WTO as well as comply with other 
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agreements such as the Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement16. During 2003, support for 
small medium-sized enterprises has been strengthened through the establishment of the 
Department for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises within the Ministry of Planning and 
Investment, as well as technical support centres in three regions. However, the 
implementation of the Enterprises Law still leaves much to be desired (CIEM 2004). 
 
It has already been pointed out that the lack of clear property rights over urban land in 
Vietnam has constrained the development both of its domestic financial and domestic 
business sectors, while poor dispute settlement mechanisms have hindered financial 
development in Cambodia. The streamlining of cumbersome laws and regulations, as well 
as improvements in the judiciary, will help domestic businesses and foreign investors, 
thereby improving the environment for the business sector generally. 
 
Provide technical and financial assistance through aid 
 
Section two above already notes that aid flows per dollar of GDP to the three Indo-China 
countries are high relative to other developing countries. Increasingly also, greater 
emphasis is being placed on human resource development and institutional capacity 
building. Even in large multilaterally-funded projects such as the World Bank’s Rural 
Finance Project II, considerable effort is being placed on training the staff in Vietnamese 
banks in the business of banking and risk assessment. Given the strong need for legal and 
regulatory reforms, a particularly urgent requirement is for human resource developments 
to complement the countries’ public administration reforms. A recent Asian Development 
Project, with the help of Japanese funding, is targeting exactly this area. 
 
In addition to building the legal/commercial infrastructure for the development of the 
financial sector, removal of administrative controls over the domestic banking system is 
another necessary step in strengthening the domestic financial sector. In the last two years, 
Vietnam has abolished quantitative credit controls and administered interest rate ceilings 
on banks, and is rapidly moving from direct to indirect instruments of monetary policy. At 
                                                 
16 As pointed out by Bosworth and Duncan (2002), WTO accession can provide the impetus for domestic 
institutional changes. However, the actual commitment rests with individual governments to make those 
institutional changes so that the countries can derive maximum benefit from participation in the WTO and 
other trade agreements.  
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the same time, it is maintaining a pegged exchange rate regime with the help of (albeit 
porous) exchange controls. Vietnam was shielded to a considerable extent from the 
macroeconomic instability of the Asian financial crisis through administrative controls 
over trade, capital flows and financial intermediation (Leung and Le Dang Doanh 1998). 
As these controls are being dismantled, the country faces increased risk of macroeconomic 
instability until its domestic financial sector is adequately strengthened and sound 
prudential controls in place. Similar challenges apply even more so to Lao PDR and 
Cambodia where financial sectors are even less developed. Policy dialogues and assistance 
with training are particularly useful during this period of vulnerability from countries in the 
region which have recent experience of currency and banking crises. 
 
Another challenge for the “New ASEANs” is the protectionism of the developed countries 
with whom they have entered trade agreements. The recent “catfish dispute” between 
Vietnam and the US is a case in point. After having successfully entered the US market as 
a result of the Vietnam-US bilateral trade agreement, the Vietnamese catfish farmers at 
first faced the charge that Vietnamese catfish could not be called “catfish” as they 
apparently differed from catfish farmed in the US. This ploy not having found to be 
successful in deterring the import and sale of catfish in the US, the Vietnamese farmers 
were charged with dumping catfish on the US market. Dispute over shrimp export is 
another example.  Financial and legal assistance is needed to settle these types of disputes 
in the international courts. Unless protectionist measures such as these can be countered 
and disputes resolved in an open and transparent manner, they could undermine the 
developing countries’ domestic political support for increased integration and internal 
liberalization.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This paper points out that, in the last decade and a half, international trade and investments 
links from Vietnam, Lao PDR and Cambodia with the Asian region as well as with the EU 
and the US have grown very rapidly, making these countries truly open economies by 
world standards. At the same time, financial linkages in the form of joint ventures and aid 
flows have also been significant. Even though administrative controls exist to prevent 
short-term capital flows, there is some evidence that these short-term flows do exist. 
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 Despite rapid external economic integration, however, internal liberalization and transition 
have lagged behind, resulting in distorted trade regimes and investment flows as well as 
underdeveloped domestic private sectors. For continued “quality” growth and effective 
integration within ASEAN, the further development of appropriate legal/commercial 
infrastructure and other market-friendly institutions is essential. 
 
Continued external integration in the form of binding international trade and investment 
agreements can help promote internal liberalization and the development of domestic 
private sectors through opening protected sectors to international competition, thereby 
lowering the costs of doing business in the three economies. Further international opening 
could also hasten the divestment of SOEs in Vietnam and Lao PDR, and improve the legal 
and regulatory institutions in all three countries. However, “WTO membership” (and 
indeed, membership of ASEAN and APEC) “is at best a complement and not a substitute 
for what is essentially a national task” (Sally 2002). Furthermore, there are risks involved 
in terms of possible macroeconomic instability and speculative attacks in the course of 
domestic and external financial sector openings.  There are also risks of non-compliance, 
and even backtracking away from international agreements, if protectionist measures from 
developed countries were not countered and disputes settled in a transparent manner.  
 
With appropriate assistance from the international and regional community, the risks of 
continued integration and transition could perhaps be managed. China’s integration into the 
world economy is providing a big impetus for the smaller transitional economies in the 
region. There is, therefore, room for cautious optimism that Vietnam, Lao PDR and 
Cambodia will, in time, be able to develop their own market institutions and participate 
more fully in world economic growth and prosperity. 
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 Appendix A. 
 
Table A1: Vietnam – Brief summary of Political, Legal, and Economic Systems. 
  
Years Legal system Political system Political Power Economic system
Before 1945 French-based 
civil law 
Under French 
regime 
Held by the 
French 
Colonial 
1945-1954 
(Democratic 
Republic of 
Vietnam) 
French style civil 
law and 
communist 
model 
Split between 
French regime 
and communist 
party 
Split, some part 
controlled by 
Communist 
party, some part 
by French 
War economy 
1954-1975     
     
North Vietnam 
(Democratic 
Republic of 
Vietnam) 
Communist 
model 
Socialist 
Republic, One 
Party system 
Communist party Centralized and 
command 
economy 
     
South Vietnam 
(Republic of 
Vietnam) 
Based partially 
on French and 
US systems 
Pro-American, 
supported by 
USA 
Unstable, backed 
by USA 
Market and war 
economy 
1976-1986 
(Socialist 
Republic of 
Vietnam) 
Communist 
model 
Socialist 
Republic, One 
Party system 
Communist party Centralized 
economy (with 
some micro-
reforms) 
1986-present  
(Socialist 
Republic of 
Vietnam) 
Greater 
economic rights 
Socialist 
Republic, One 
party system 
Communist party Transition 
towards market 
economy 
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Table A2: Lao PDR – Brief summary of Political, Legal, and Economic Systems. 
 
Years Legal system Political 
system 
Political Power Economic 
system 
Before 1954 French-base 
civil code and 
Under French 
protectorate 
Colonial 
judiciary 
Held by the 
French 
French 
Colonial 
1955-1975     
Country separated 
into two systems 
    
     
(1) The Kingdom 
of Lao led by King 
Souvanna Phouma 
French-base 
civil code and 
judiciary 
Monarchy Held by King 
Souvanna 
Phouma  and 
strongly 
supported by 
USA 
Market 
Economy 
     
(2) The 
independence 
territory led by 
Kaysone 
Phomvihan the 
leader of the Lao 
People's 
Revolutionary  
Party 
Soviet Union- 
based system 
Communist 
Party, Central 
committee and 
local 
committees 
Held by leader 
of the Lao 
People's 
Revolutionary 
Party, Kaysone 
Phomvihan, 
supported by 
Vietnam and 
Soviet Union 
Soviet Union 
model 
1975-1986  
Lao People 
Democratic 
Republic 
Soviet Union- 
based system 
Socialist 
Republic 
Held by leader 
of the Lao 
People's 
Revolutionary 
Party 
Centrally 
planned 
economy, 
Soviet Union 
model 
1986-present 
Lao People 
Democratic 
Republic was 
established 
Transition to 
common law 
system 
Republic, one 
party system 
Held by leader 
of the Lao 
People's 
Revolutionary 
Party 
Transition to 
market 
economy 
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 Table A3: Cambodia – Brief summary of Political, Legal, and Economic Systems. 
 
Years Legal system Political system Political Power Economic system
Before 1953 French-based 
civil code and 
judiciary 
Under French 
protectorate 
Held by the 
French 
Colonial 
1953-1970 (The 
Kingdom of 
Cambodia) 
French-based 
civil code and 
judiciary 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Held by Prince 
Norodom 
Sihanouk as 
prime minister 
Market and then 
nationalized 
1970-1975 (The 
Khmer Republic) 
French-based 
civil code and 
judiciary 
Republic Held by Lon Nol Market, war 
economy 
1975-1979 
(Democratic 
Kampuchea) 
Legal system 
destroyed 
All previous 
systems 
abolished, 
extreme Maoist 
agrocommunism
Khmer Rouge Agrarian, 
centrally planned
1979-1989 (The 
people's Republic 
of Kampuchea) 
Vietnamese 
communist 
model 
Communist 
party, central 
committee, and 
local committees
Cambodian 
People's Party 
(Vietnamese 
backed) 
Central planning
1989-1993 (The 
State of 
Cambodia) 
Greater 
economic rights 
Communist 
party, central 
committee, and 
local committees
Cambodian 
People's Party 
(Vietnamese 
backed) 
Central planning
1993-present 
(The Kingdom of 
Cambodia) 
French-based 
civil code 
combined with 
common law in 
certain sectors 
Constitutional 
Monarchy 
Shared between 
FUNCINPEC* 
and the 
Cambodian 
People's Party 
Transition to  
market economy 
* National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia. 
Source: - Chandier (1991), Mekong Law Group et al, 1999. 
- ADB, 2001. Key Governance Issues in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Viet Nam, [Online], Available 
at: <URL: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Governance_Issues/>, Accessed date: August 19, 
2003. 
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Appendix B 
Appendix B.1 
 
Table B.1: Vietnam – Balance of Payments. 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Current account balance -1,664 -1,067 1,285 642 670 -391
  Excluding official transfers -1,839 -1,239 1,154 506 520 -522
   
  Trade balance -1,315 -981 1,080 378 627 -875
    Exports, f.o.b. 9,145 9,365 11,540 14,449 15,027 16,706
    Imports, f.o.b. 10,460 10,346 10,460 14,071 14,400 17,581
  Non-factor services (net) -623 -539 -547 -615 -572 -648
    Receipts 2,530 2,604 2,493 2,695 2,810 2,948
    Payments 3,153 3,143 3,040 3,310 3,382 3,596
  Investment income (net) -611 -669 -429 -597 -635 -766
    Receipts 136 133 142 185 160 167
    Payments 747 802 571 782 795 933
  Transfers (net) 885 1,122 1,181 1,476 1,250 1,898
    Private 710 950 1,050 1,340 1,100 1,767
    Official 175 172 131 136 150 131
    
Capital account balance 1,662 216 -334 -772 -307 1,801
    
  Gross foreign direct investment 
  (FDI) inflows 
2,074 800 700 800 900 1,100
    Equity 1,002 240 301 320 540 715
    Loan disbursements 1,072 560 399 480 360 385
  FDI loan repayments 174 372 603 601 819 414
  Medium and long-term loans (net) 375 432 605 729 623 487
    Disbursements 1,007 1,121 1,036 1,411 988 1,077
      ODA loans 550 796 970 1,361 958 1,020
      Commercial loans 457 326 66 50 30 56
    Scheduled amortization 1/ 632 690 431 682 365 590
  Short term capital (net) -612 -644 -1,036 -1,700 -1,011 628
   
Errors and omissions -2 327 -183 246 -169 -946
   
Overall balance -4 -524 768 115 194 464
Source:  - International Monetary Fund 2003, Vietnam - Statistical Appendix, Country Report No. 03/382, 
Washington D.C, USA. 
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Table B.2: Lao PDR – Balance of Payments. 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 (Est.)
Current account -124 -226 -185 -56 -60 -24 -61
   (excluding official transfers) -233 -307 -282 -130 -129 -145 -122
   
   Merchandise trade balance -276 -368 -331 -216 -212 -218 -218
   
      Export, f.o.b. 313 321 317 337 342 351 350
      Import, c.i.f 589 690 648 553 554 569 567
   
   Services (net) 27 25 28 71 98 126 141
   
   Income (net) -6 -7 -22 -34 -45 -73 -68
   
   Transfer (net) 131 125 140 123 99 142 83
      Private 22 43 43 49 30 21 22
      Official 109 82 97 74 70 121 61
         Of which: technical  
         Assistance 14 14 19 17 14 22 11
   
Capital account 139 295 155 38 63 68 59
   
   Long-term loans 83 139 161 86 65 63 74
   
   Foreign investment (including
   external loans) 95 176 104 56 82 31 33
      Of which: hydropower 
       Investment 60 18 30 0 0
    
   Commercial banks (net) 10 -7 14 -17 -47 25 34
   
   Errors and omissions -49 -13 -125 -86 -37 -51 -82
   
Overall balance 15 69 -30 -18 3 44 -2
Source: - Data for 1995-1996: International Monetary Fund 2001, Lao People's Democratic Republic: 
Recent Economic Developments, IMF Staff Country Report No. 00/03, Washington D.C, USA. 
- Data for 1997-2001: International Monetary Fund 2002, Lao People's Democratic Republic: Selected Issues 
and Statistical Appendix, Country Report No. 02/207, Washington D.C, USA. 
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Table B.3: Cambodia – Balance of Payments. 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Est.
 
Current account excluding official 
transfers 
-382 -456 -421 -348 -359 -429
Current account including official transfers -183 -180 -104 -45 -48 -101
  
Trade balance -365 -462 -538 -523 -564 -537
   Exports 800 1,129 1,401 1,571 1,749 2,076
      Domestic exports 1/ 679 997 1,283 1,462 1,638 1,960
   Imports, f.o.b. -1,166 -1,591 -1,939 -2,094 -2,314 -2,613
      Of which: retained imports, f.o.b. -1,072 -1,490 -1,849 -2,010 -2,228 -2,524
Services and income (net) -106 -99 -26 37 56 -54
   Receipts 225 345 496 582 655 568
      Of which: tourism 107 212 304 380 454 386
   Payments -331 -444 -522 -545 -599 -622
      Of which: interest -13 -14 -15 -15 -16 -18
Private transfers 89 105 144 137 149 163
Official transfers 199 276 317 303 312 328
  
Capital and financial account 73 81 42 91 107 133
Medium- and long-term loans -62 -61 -24 64 133 120
   Disbursements 52 53 90 98 168 160
   Amortization -114 -114 -114 -35 -34 -40
Foreign direct investment 223 221 142 142 139 77
Short-term flows and errors and omissions -88 -79 -75 -115 -165 -65
  
Overall balance -110 -99 -62 45 60 33
  
Financing 110 99 62 -45 -60 -33
Change in gross official reserves -11 -32 -62 -64 -115 -73
Debt rescheduling 0 0 0 -16 0 0
Change in arrears (- = reduction) 123 123 120 26 46 42
Use of Fund credit -1 8 4 9 9 -2
   Purchases/disbursements 0 11 11 21 22 12
   Repurchases/repayments 1 3 7 12 12 13
Source: International Monetary Fund 2004, Cambodia: Statistical Appendix, Country Report No. 04/330, 
Washington D.C, USA. 
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 Appendix C 
 
Appendix C.1. 
 
Vietnam - The commodity composition of exports and imports: 1995-2002  
(percentages) 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Exports   
Primary products (non-oil) 70.6 70.1 63.3 63.4 62.9   
Rice 9.5 11.7 9.5 10.9 8.9 4.6 3.9 4.4
Coffee 10.6 4.6 5.4 6.3 5.1 3.5 2.6 1.9
Fish/Seafood 8.3 8.9 8.6 9.2 8.4 10.2 12.0 12.2
Petroleum 19.7 18.3 15.6 13.2 18.1 24.2 21.1 19.5
Other primary products    
Manufactured products 28.4 29.0 36.7 36.6 37.1   
Clothing 8.3 15.7 16.4 15.5 15.1 13.1 13.3 16.4
Footwear 3.8 7.2 10.7 11.0 12.0 10.1 10.1 11.1
Electronic products 4.8 5.3 5.1 5.4 n.a 3.1
Handicrafts 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.0
Other manufactures    
Imports    
Machinery & equipment 25.7 27.6 30.3 30:5 30.1 30.9  
Fuels & raw materials 59.1 60.0 59.6 61.0 63.5 63.8  
Consumer goods 15.2 12.4 10.1 8.5 6.4 5.3  
Source:  - GSO and CIEM data files.  
- Data for 2001: The World Bank, 2003. Country information – Vietnam – Table 3.2:  Merchandise exports 
by commodity, [Online], Available at: <URL: 
http://www.worldbank.org.vn/data/excel/VDR2003_table3.2.xls>, Accessed date: 10/10/2003. 
- Data for 2002: Vietnam Panorama, 2003. Vietnam trade data, [Online], Available at: <URL: 
http://www.vietnampanorama.com/trade.asp>, Accessed date: 10/10/2003. 
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 Appendix C.2. 
 
Lao PDR - The composition of export by commodity 
(percentages) 
No Major Exportation Items 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
1 Timber and Furniture 29 19 16 23 22 22 23 24
2 Coffee 10 11 20 11 9 4 5 3
3 Handicrafts 0 0 1 1 2 1 1 N/a
4 Garment 26 36 31 30 29 28 31 34
5 Electricity 12 12 13 21 33 26 27 35
6 Industrial Products 14 13 12 8 1 5 8 N/a
7 Other 9 8 8 5 5 14 6 N/a
 Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source:  - Ministry of commerce of The Lao PDR 
- Data for 2002: Asian Development Bank 2004, Key Indicators 2004: Poverty in Asia: 
Measurement, Estimates, and Prospects, [Online], Available at: <URL: 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2004/default.asp>, Accessed date: 
30/11/2004. 
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 Appendix C.3. 
 
Cambodia - Exports by Commodity 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
     
 Share of main commodity & service export in total exports (percentages)
     
Logs  10.1 20.7 8.4 4.7 9.1 7.2 2.2 0.2 0.2 
Sawn Timber 12.4 16.0 9.1 12.0 12.5 8.1 5.5 1.2 0.3 1.2
Fish products 12.0 6.2 3.6 4.2 4.6 4.5 4.3 3.1 2.2 1.8
Rubber 7.7 4.3 3.3 3.0 2.0 3.5 3.1 2.3 1.8 4.7
Re-exports 27.0 35.1 54.7 41.0 29.8 28.0 23.5 14.0 9.2 5.6
Other exports 3.3 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 3.1
Garments 1.2 0.6 2.9 11.4 26.2 36.4 47.9 65.4 72.7 79
     
Total goods 
export 
73.7 84.4 83.2 77.2 84.6 88.0 86.9 86.8 86.9 N/a
     
Service export 26.3 15.6 16.8 22.8 15.4 12.0 13.1 13.2 13.1 N/a
 Source:  - Ministry of Economy and Finance, Cambodia. 
- Data for 2002: Asian Development Bank 2004, Key Indicators 2004: Poverty in Asia: Measurement, 
Estimates, and Prospects, [Online], Available at: <URL: 
http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Key_Indicators/2004/default.asp>, Accessed date: 30/11/2004. 
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Appendix D: 
 
Table D.1: Business Costs in Selected Capital Cities (US$) 
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r 
Ja
ka
rta
 
M
an
ila
 
Worker's 
salary/month 94 113 
45-
100 60 248 468 176 329 64 228 
Engineer’s 
salary/month 251 221 250 300 447 1.313 378 668 190 344 
Middle-level 
manager’s 
salary/month 511 488 500 400 453 2163 727 1,407 723 620 
Expenses for office 
lease/month/m2 23 16 15 15 24 42 13 17 19 28 
Expenses for house 
rent for foreign 
representative 1,850 1,800 1,500 1,000 1,500 2,285 1,420 920 2,000 1,970 
International 
telephone cost (A 3 
minute call to 
Japan) 8.52 8.52 6 6.7 4.3 2.23 3.11 2.61 2.59 3.78 
Electricity cost for 
business/KWh 0.07 0.07 0.25 0.04 0.035 0.05 0.03 0.06 0.0177 0.09 
Container 
transportation 
(40/fl/container) 
(from factory to 
Yukohama port) 1825 1375 1418 N/a 880 670 1466 895 1252 994 
Petrol price (1 liter) 0.31 0.31 0.51 0.4 0.3 0.74 0.34 0.29 0.138 0.35 
Personal income 
tax (Highest tax 
rate, %) 50 50 30 37* 45 29 37 29 30 33 
* Income tax rate for foreign investor is only 10% (flat rate) 
Source: - Phnom Penh – Cambodian Ministry of Commerce. 
 - Vientiane – National Statistics Bureau, Lao PDR. 
 - Other cities - Le Dang Doanh (2002). 
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